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Abstract
Dodd-Frank, the US financial reform law passed in response to the 2008 financial crisis, es-
tablished the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), a new federal regulator with 
the sole responsibility of protecting consumers from unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices. 
This decision marked the end of a highly politicized reform debate in the US Congress, 
involving lobbying from business associations and civil society groups, in which propo-
nents of the new bureau would normally have been considered to be much weaker than its 
opponents. Paradoxically, an emerging civil society coalition successfully lobbied decision-
makers and countered industry attempts to prevent industry capture. What explains the 
fact that rather weak and peripheral actors prevailed over more resourceful and dominant 
actors? The goal of this study is to examine and challenge questions of regulatory capture by 
concentrated industry interests in the reform debates in response to the credit crisis which 
originated in the US in 2007. The analysis suggests that for weak actors to prevail in policy 
conflicts over established, resource-rich opponents, they must undertake broad coalition-
building among themselves and with influential elite allies outside and inside of Congress 
who share the same policy goals.
Keywords: Financial crisis, financial regulation, consumer protection, interest groups, lob-
bying
Résumé
[La force des intérêts faibles dans la réforme financière américaine de l’après-crise: Explica-
tion de la création du Bureau de protection des consommateurs de produits financiers] La 
loi Dodd-Frank de réforme financière (2010), adoptée aux États-Unis en réponse à la crise 
de 2008, a créé le Bureau de protection des consommateurs de produits financiers (CFPB), 
agence fédérale ayant pour unique mission de protéger ces consommateurs des pratiques 
déloyales, mensongères ou abusives. Telle a été l’issue d’un débat parlementaire hautement 
politisé, qui a mobilisé les groupes d’intérêt du monde financier et de la société civile et où 
l’on se serait attendu à voir les seconds, partisans du nouvel organisme, succomber sous 
la puissance infiniment supérieure des premiers. Or, paradoxalement, une coalition de la 
société civile tout juste créée a réussi à convaincre les législateurs, à contrecarrer les efforts 
de la profession et à empêcher une capture de régulation par les intérêts financiers. Pour-
quoi des acteurs plutôt faibles et périphériques l’ont-ils emporté sur des acteurs riches et 
puissants ? Pour expliquer ce résultat inattendu d’un changement de réglementation fa-
vorable aux intérêts diffus, l’article propose un mécanisme causal des relations qui, dans 
le contexte de l’après-crise, se sont nouées entre groupes de la société civile et décideurs 
publics. Il montre que, dans un conflit de politique publique, des acteurs faibles confrontés 
à des adversaires mieux établis et plus riches doivent, pour l’emporter, construire une large 
coalition et trouver des alliés influents hors de l’État et en son sein.
Mots-clés: crise financière, régulation financière, groups d’intérêts, lobbying, protection 
des consommateurs
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The Power of Weak Interests in Financial Reforms: 
Explaining the Creation of a US Consumer Agency
1 Introduction
On 21 July 2010, United States President Barack Obama signed the Dodd–Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank Act) into law, including ma-
jor consumer protection provisions which fundamentally changed the regulatory land-
scape for financial services. Dodd–Frank’s preamble declares one object to be “to protect 
consumers from abusive financial services practices.”1 Under Title X, the reform law es-
tablished the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), a new federal regulator 
with the sole responsibility of protecting consumers from unfair, deceptive, or abusive 
practices. There is wide agreement among regulators, activists and industry representa-
tives that the consumer protection reforms introduced in response to the crisis go be-
yond mere “gesture politics.” 
The political debate surrounding the creation of the agency was characterized by intense 
lobbying and mobilization by interest groups from two opposing camps. An emerg-
ing coalition of relatively resource-poor civil society actors, including consumer asso-
ciations, trade unions, NGOs, grass-roots groups, and small business groups actively 
supported the new consumer regulator. They were opposed by a much more powerful 
financial lobby. Johnson and Kwak (2011: 198) write that the financial industry and 
its defenders “closed ranks” against the bureau. Arguably, the new consumer bureau 
attracted more hostility from industry groups than any other reform proposal after 
the crisis. Strong opposition came from the American Bankers’ Association (ABA), the 
US Chamber of Commerce, and the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA). Against all 
odds, the civil society coalition, formed among actors usually classified as weak, man-
aged to win a major victory when the President signed Dodd–Frank into law – includ-
ing a powerful new regulator for consumer financial products. In his remarks at the 
signing ceremony of the Act, the President described the reforms in the bill as “the 
strongest consumer financial protections in history.”2 
1 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 
1376 (2010), Preamble (describing the purposes of Dodd–Frank).
2 President Barack H. Obama, Remarks on Signing the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (21 July 2010), available at <www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
remarks-president-signing-Dodd–Frank-wall-street-reform-and-consumer-protection-act>.
Earlier drafts of this paper were presented at the Graduate Conference at Columbia University, New 
York, 6–9 July 2014, and at the IMPRS-SPCE Doctoral Colloquium in Cologne, 10 December 2014. 
I would like to thank all the participants of these workshops. I also thank Cornelia Woll, Christine 
Trampusch, Jens Beckert, Martin Höpner, Olivier Godechot, Emiliano Grossman, Pepper Culpepper, 
Kevin Young, Elsa Massoc, Robert Mayer, the anonymous reviewers and the editors for their helpful 
comments. Additional thanks go to MaxPo and the MPIfG as well as all the interview partners.
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Despite the fact that massive industry lobbying had successfully slowed down the im-
plementation process of US financial regulatory reform − with 60 percent of Dodd–
Frank’s rules not yet in place by 1 July 20133 – the creation of the CFPB was a unique 
achievement for consumer advocates. The outcome is puzzling, as we would normally 
expect more resourceful groups to have more political influence. In particular, the US 
banking industry is one of the most resourceful, powerful, and politically savvy actors 
in Washington, winning many of their political battles. The CFPB is therefore a case 
in point to study the power of weak interests in financial regulation. Why was the US 
banking industry not able to beat out consumer groups in the case at hand? What ex-
plains the fact that rather weak and peripheral actors prevailed over more resourceful 
and dominant actors? 
Analyzing financial reforms in response to the crisis, international political economy 
(IPE) scholars so far have focused on explaining the incrementality of reform outcomes 
(Admati/Hellwig 2013; Buckley/Howarth 2010; Johnson/Kwak 2011; Moschella/Tsin-
gou 2013), thereby neglecting the empirical universe of cases of regulatory reforms that 
brought about sea changes in spite of industry opposition. In this paper, I look beyond 
the impact of material resources in influencing policy decisions. In offering a close em-
pirical analysis of a causal mechanism4 at work that allows relatively poorly-resourced, 
diffuse interest groups5 to leave their imprint on financial regulatory reforms, the ac-
count here will deal with a side that is less well known to researchers. The study responds 
to recent calls for greater attention to “the mobilization of nonfinancial industry groups 
in shaping financial regulatory policies and the impact that this has over the capacity of 
financial industry groups to shape regulatory policies” (Pagliari/Young 2013). It thereby 
adds a crucial dimension – namely, the role of citizen groups – to the burgeoning litera-
ture on financial regulation. 
The paper offers one of the first scholarly analyses of the successful creation of a new 
financial regulator with the sole responsibility to protect consumers (for other stud-
ies, see Kirsch/Mayer 2012; Woolley/Ziegler 2012). Analyzing consumer credit market 
reforms is particularly interesting because abusive consumer lending practices – in par-
ticular in the mortgage market, but also in relation to credit cards and other subprime 
consumer credit products – allegedly contributed to the financial meltdown that started 
in 2007. The empirical analysis is based on about 40 interviews with representatives 
from civil society and industry as well as policy-makers and regulators in Washington 
between September 2013 and March 2014. For the legislative proposals investigated 
here, I conducted interviews with senior-level elites, ranging from Congressional staff-
3 Updated versions of Dodd–Frank Progress Reports by Davis Polk are available at <www.da-
vispolk.com/ Dodd–Frank-Rulemaking-Progress-Report>.
4 There is a myriad of different understandings of causal mechanisms. Here, I follow the sugges-
tion by Beach and Pedersen that a causal mechanism is a system “that transmit[s] causal forces 
from X to Y …, assuming that the context that allows them to operate is present” (2013: 34).
5 Diffuse interests are understood here as “collective interests held by large numbers of individu-
als,” such as consumer protection policies (Pollack 1997: 572).
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ers (often senior advisors) and government officials to interest groups that had par-
ticular responsibilities for the proposed legislation as well as detailed knowledge of the 
negotiations. Theory-testing process tracing will allow us to trace social mechanisms 
linking diffuse interests to policy change in consumer credit markets in order to open 
the black box of preference attainment. The analysis suggests that in order for weak ac-
tors to prevail over established, resource-rich opponents in policy conflicts, they must 
undertake broad coalition-building among themselves and with influential elite allies 
outside and inside of Congress who share the same policy goals. 
The case logic follows a crucial case study based on a “least-likely” design (Gerring 
2007; Levy 2008). Although diffuse consumer interests have “systematically dominated 
national policy processes” (Trumbull 2012: 10) in various policy areas in the postwar 
period, the effect of civic non-state actors is expected to be low in a highly technical 
policy field such as financial regulation, which is dominated by savvy and resourceful 
financial industry groups. Hence, the aim here is to show the policy influence of weak 
interests under difficult conditions, “since if we are able to find the mechanism in a 
non-favorable setting, this significantly increases our confidence in the existence of the 
causal mechanism in a wider population of cases” (Beach/Pedersen 2013: 152).
The paper begins by briefly outlining the degree of policy change and the political 
struggles surrounding the creation of the new regulator. It will then present four test-
able propositions derived from the literature to explain policy change representing dif-
fuse interests in financial regulation. In order to interpret the policy process, the next 
section will use process tracing to apply theoretically derived hypotheses to the empiri-
cal record of the case study. The conclusion will reflect on the implications for our un-
derstanding of regulatory capture.6 This paper joins recent efforts in political economy 
to explain how business power can be curbed (Bell/Hindmoor 2013; Culpepper 2011).
2 Policy change: A new regulator
The system of consumer finance protection on the eve of the crisis was marked by regu-
latory gaps, allowing for ruthless lending practices which contributed to increased de-
faults and eventually to the meltdown of the US housing market. In order to address 
the regulatory failure of the past, the Dodd–Frank Act centralized consumer protection 
regulations at one single agency, which operates independently, is well-funded, and is 
under the leadership of a single director. The Bureau was established in Title X of the 
reform law as an independent regulatory agency within the Federal Reserve System 
(“Fed”) with the sole responsibility of protecting consumers of financial products. The 
6 The process whereby narrow industry interests come to be favored at the expense of the more 
diffuse public interest is commonly referred to as “regulatory capture” (Pagliari 2012).
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CFPB’s mission is to ensure “that all consumers have access to markets for consumer fi-
nancial products and services [that] are fair, transparent, and competitive.”7 In charging 
one single agency with consumer protection responsibilities, the reform succeeded in 
replacing a patchwork of seven different agencies, thereby consolidating and strength-
ening the regulation of consumer financial products. Not only does the CFPB consoli-
date the consumer protection functions of various agencies, it also consolidates con-
sumer protection legislation previously found in a number of different statutes (such 
as the Truth in Lending Act and the CARD Act of 2009). The new bureau also hosts 
a national consumer complaint hotline as a single toll-free number for consumers to 
report problems, as well as a new Office of Financial Education to promote financial 
literacy. While the CFPB is administratively located within the Fed, the Board of Gover-
nors cannot interfere in its operations. 
Table 1 summarizes the main features of the CFPB as signed into law in July 2010. The 
Dodd–Frank Act delegated three types of authority to the new bureau: the CFPB con-
ducts rule-making, supervision and enforcement for federal consumer financial protec-
tion laws. The Bureau has the authority to oversee very large banks, thrifts, and credit 
unions with assets over $ 10 billion, as well as non-bank businesses (companies that can 
offer consumer financial products or services without having a bank, thrift, or credit 
union charter). The CFPB was the first federal regulator that not only has the ability 
to write rules for non-banks, but it also has the ability to supervise and examine non-
banks – “a power that has never accrued to any federal bureau before.”8 It is a first in 
the history of non-banks that they are subject to examination by federal regulators. 
This makes the CFPB a much more powerful regulator for consumer financial services 
than the Federal Trade Commission was, with its sole authority over non-bank entities 
(Pridgen 2013). More importantly, the agency has independent funding, specified as a 
percentage of the Fed’s budget, and is not subject to the appropriations process. The 
fact that the CFPB receives its funding outside of the appropriations process was an 
important aspect for consumer advocates, since it “avoids the annual congressional ap-
propriations process that can serve as a mechanism for imposing undesirable political 
pressure” (Cooley 2010: 79). Another important provision is that the Dodd–Frank Act 
curbs federal preemption, which had previously prevented effective pro-consumer state 
legislation. The law functions as a federal “floor” (not a ceiling) which allows states to 
raise the level of consumer protection, one of the key demands of consumer advocates. 
Title X expands state authority by allowing states to adopt stricter consumer protection 
laws on top of the federal regulations. 
Taken together, the new bureau’s powers should “serve as counterweight within the gov-
ernment to a set of regulatory agencies that have historically seen the world from the 
perspective of the banks they regulate rather than the customers served by those banks” 
(Johnson/Kwak 2011: 200). Some might object that the new regulator for consumer 
7 Dodd–Frank, § 1021(a).
8 Interview 65a with representative of consumer association: Washington, DC, 5 August 2011.
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products was “merely a fig leaf covering the raw influence of concentrated interests” 
(Trumbull 2012: 28) in the financial overhaul. A reason to think that this was not the 
case is the amount of resources the industry invested to defeat the new bureau. Industry 
groups had clearly preferred the status quo, and the regulation passed in spite of indus-
try attempts to block it. Moreover, a broad range of experts, including consumer law-
yers, industry groups and consumer associations, have widely acknowledged the CFPB 
as a powerful new regulator (Caggiano et al. 2011; Pridgen 2013). 
3 The advocacy campaign for a new consumer regulator
To define the temporal context in this analysis, I have chosen the financial crisis that 
originated in 2007, since it is a clear starting point that sets the causal mechanism in 
motion. The case study analysis therefore starts here, with a brief chronology of the pas-
sage of the reform law starting in early 2009, when legislative debate about post-crisis 
regulatory reform started to unfold. In June 2009, the Treasury included the proposal 
of a new consumer agency in its 90-page White Paper entitled “A New Foundation: Re-
building Financial Supervision and Regulation,” which served as a blueprint for finan-
cial reform. The White Paper proposed five objectives for financial reform, including a 
“Consumer Financial Protection Agency (CFPA), with the authority and accountability 
Table 1 Main features of the CFPB under the Dodd–Frank Act as signed into law in 2010
Structure/Head Agency established within the Fed; single Director appointed by the 
President for 5-year term.
Funding Transfer of 10–12 percent of the Fed’s budget.
Coverage/Authority Broad powers over any person, other than those explicitly carved out from 
the Bureau’s authority, engaged in the provision of a consumer financial 
product or service.
Notable carveouts Carveout for auto dealers and small businesses.
“Plain vanilla” provision No provision of “standard consumer financial products or services.”
Authority over consumer 
laws
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) exempt from CFPB authority.
Mortgage provision Prohibition of steering incentives for mortgage originators and 
requirement to verify ability to repay residential mortgage loans.
Examination and enforcement
power over smaller financial 
institutions
Smaller financial institutions (with assets of $10 billion or less) will 
continue to be subject to the examination and enforcement authority  
of their current regulators.
Relationship to state law 
(federal preemption)
Would only preempt state consumer financial protection laws to the 
extent of their inconsistency, where state laws providing greater consumer 
protection are not to be considered inconsistent with federal law.
Oversight by the Financial 
Stability Oversight Council
Financial Stability Oversight Council with ability to set aside CFPB 
regulations if the regulation “would put the safety and soundness of the 
banking system or the stability of the financial system at risk.”
Source: Assembled by the author.
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to make sure that consumer protection regulations are written fairly and enforced vig-
orously” (Department of the Treasury 2009). In September, the legislative debate sub-
sequently moved to the House of Representatives, which passed its bill in early Decem-
ber 2009. The main venue of discussion was the House Financial Services Committee, 
chaired by Representative Barney Frank. The Senate Banking Committee, chaired by 
Senator Christopher Dodd, discussed the bill in February and March 2010. The Con-
ference Committee finalized its report on 29 June 2010. The bill subsequently moved 
separately to both the House and Senate floors, where it was voted on during the last 
week of June by the House and in mid-July by the Senate.9 On 21 July, President Obama 
signed the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act into law.
At several stages during the legislative process, passage of the CFPB was at the tipping 
point. In order to secure a bipartisan deal, Senator Dodd had set out to form a com-
promise that would have strengthened the consumer protection division of an existing 
federal agency instead of creating a stand-alone bureau (Palletta 2010). According to 
Senator Bob Corker, the CFPB’s creation was “the most contentious issue” and “the 
elephant in the room” during the Senate’s negotiations that prevented any bipartisan 
agreement on the bill (Rowley/Lerer 2010). On 5 May 2010, Senator Richard Shelby in-
troduced an amendment on the Senate floor that would have weakened CFPB’s powers 
and removed its independence by placing the bureau under the FDIC’s control and bar-
ring it from examining or regulating depository institutions (Wilmarth 2012). However, 
the amendment was defeated by the Democratic majority in the Senate. Eventually, on 
20 May 2010, the Senate – by a vote of 59 to 39 – also approved a comprehensive finan-
cial reform bill, including Title X, a Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection within 
the Fed, which would be provided similar authorities over consumer financial products 
and services to those proposed for the CFPA by the House bill (H.R. 4173). The Senate’s 
vote paved the way to convene the House–Senate conference committee to reconcile the 
two different bills and settle on a compromise. 
The proposal of an independent consumer regulator pitted two coalitions against each 
other. From the beginning, business groups – mainly the ABA, the MBA and the Ameri-
can Chamber of Commerce – opposed the legislative proposal of a new consumer regu-
lator. These groups are well organized and possess ample material resources. According 
to the Center for Responsive Politics, the financial industry mobilized and spent $ 224.6 
million on lobbying in 2009, more than any other sector except for the health sector, 
which spent $ 263.6 million during the same time period (Renick Mayer 2009). The US 
Chamber set up a “stoptheCFPA.com” website10 and started an advertising campaign of 
at least $ 2 million aimed at defeating the new bureau.When he testified before the Sen-
ate Committee on Banking, Edward Yingling (2009), president of the ABA, complained 
that the CFPB would undermine innovation, limit consumer choice, complicate exist-
9 The Administration’s CFPA Act; H.R. 4173, Title IV, as it passed the House, and S.3217, Title X, 
as it passed the Senate.
10 The website is no longer operational and redirects to <www.cfpbspotlight.com>.
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ing regulatory structures, and disproportionately burden small banks and credit unions. 
The Bankers Association’s public outcry against a consumer agency and the appear-
ance of its president to testify in front of a Congressional Committee made clear that 
preventing the enactment of a consumer bureau was of high legislative priority to the 
industry.
The new consumer regulator was actively promoted by a new pro-reform coalition. 
About the same time that the administration brought forward its reform proposals, a 
new coalition of about 250 civil society organizations started to actively support the 
creation of a consumer regulator. The US Public Interest Research Group (PIRG), to-
gether with other NGOs and the largest labor groups, including the AFL-CIO and the 
SEIU, established a new and unprecedented coalition of labor, civil rights, small busi-
ness and senior organizations, which formally went public in May 2009 as “Americans 
for Financial Reform” (AFR).
In terms of material resources, the pro-reform coalition was clearly outmatched by the 
opposing financial industry lobby. Funding for pro-reform groups became available 
from progressive foundations, with AFR raising about $ 1.4 million in the first year, 
only a fraction of the financial industry’s lobbying budget.11 Nevertheless, consumer 
and labor groups, representing diffuse interests, saw their preferences translated into 
public policy, despite more resourceful and influential opponents. In the final bill, the 
pro-reform advocates had met their major policy aims: in accordance with activists’ 
wishes, the new bureau had market-wide coverage and a single director; its funds were 
not subject to the congressional appropriations process; and it had significant author-
ity on rules supervision and enforcement over banks and non-banks. As one consumer 
activist commented on the legislation: “Compared to a world where we could not make 
a single advance on consumer regulation for decades, this is a big change.”12 How did 
diffuse consumer interests come to be reflected in the reform outcome?
4 A plausible mechanism of post-crisis regulatory reform dynamics
To respond to this question, I will outline a plausible causal mechanism of reform tra-
jectories after the crisis, following the research strategy proposed for theory-testing 
process tracing by Beach and Pedersen (2013). My main rival hypothesis in this article 
is an account based on capture theories, which claims that the outcome of financial 
reforms can only be explained with reference to industry preferences and their transla-
tion into policy. Regulatory capture, the most accepted account of regulatory change in 
11 Interview 10 with consumer advocate: Washington, DC, 28 September 2013.
12 Interview 3a with consumer advocate: Washington, DC, 6 September 2013.
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the aftermath of the financial crisis, is important but somewhat incomplete.13 It offers 
a compelling account, based on the power of financial industry lobbies, of why reforms 
enacted in response to the crisis were rather incremental in nature. However, it does not 
account for the empirical universe of cases of regulatory reforms that brought about sea 
changes in spite of industry opposition. Further, as several critiques of capture theories 
have pointed out, industry capture is often merely assumed, rather than empirically 
tested (Young 2013; Carpenter/Moss 2014). Gunnar Trumbull (2012) has just recently 
drawn our attention to processes through which Olson’s logic of collective action can 
be inverted by consumer groups’ ability to increase policy legitimacy in the public eye.
So far, only a few studies on Dodd–Frank have acknowledged that traditional capture 
dynamics surrounding financial regulatory policy-making were significantly altered 
by the shock of the credit crises (Clapp/Helleiner 2012; Pagliari/Young 2012; Woolley/
Ziegler 2011; Young 2013). Although these studies hint at the importance of increased 
actor plurality, brought about in particular by newly mobilizing civil actors, the precise 
role of newly mobilized interest groups beyond the traditional financial groups remains 
largely implicit, or at best underdeveloped. More generally, the deficiency in these ac-
counts is that the causal dynamics of how groups outside of finance become successful 
change agents as a countervailing force to financial industry interests remain largely 
black-boxed. Clearly, it would be useful to understand more about how diffuse interest 
groups were able to confront the powerful financial lobby to have their preferences met 
in post-crisis regulatory reforms in a more systematic manner. The present analysis fills 
this gap. Yet while this paper builds on prior work, it goes beyond it in carefully speci-
fying the causal mechanism that can explain regulatory change representing diffuse 
interests. I suggest that research on social movements and regulatory politics provides 
tools to complement existing approaches to explaining post-crisis financial reforms by 
identifying additional mechanisms that help delineate unexpected reform trajectories. 
Because social mechanisms operate in specific contexts, we need to pay close attention 
to how the crisis altered the contextual conditions for regulatory reforms in order to 
understand the increased political receptivity to consumer demands and sudden (at 
least partial) redistribution of power away from concentrated industry interests to more 
diffuse consumer interests. The contextual conditions allowing the causal mechanism 
to operate are marked by a (temporary) de-legitimization of the financial industry af-
ter the financial crisis which somewhat neutralized the financial sector’s organizational 
advantage and led to increasing frictions with policy-makers, thereby changing interest 
group dynamics. According to recent research in International Political Economy, the 
financial crisis at least temporarily neutralized the organizational advantage of financial 
sector groups. The post-crisis financial regulatory environment was generally marked 
by increased issue salience and negative publicity for the financial sector (Quaglia 2010). 
Heightened media attention certainly increased the perception of undue industry in-
13 While regulatory capture theory was initially designed to explain the behavior of regulatory 
agencies, not legislative decisions, the concept has since been applied more broadly to financial 
regulatory decision-making.
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fluence. Applying his theory of quiet politics to post-crisis politics, Culpepper (2011: 
197) predicts “a weakened bargaining position” for organized interests in a “radically 
changed political environment” which was “under intense public scrutiny.” Various 
scholars have argued that the financial crisis had thrown the existing neo-liberal order 
and financial community into a “legitimacy crisis” (Helleiner 2010; Morgan 2010). A 
series of theoretically derived propositions, all considered necessary elements of a larger 
causal chain, will be tested in the case study:
1 Political opportunities – access and receptivity: Qualitative changes in the post-cri-
sis institutional context in which financial regulatory policies were developed, combined 
with increased political receptivity, allowed for increased access on the part of diffuse 
interest groups (Princen/Kerremans 2008; Culpepper 2011).
2 Mobilization of diffuse interests: The crisis-induced organization as an advocacy co-
alition spurred by the perception of a window of opportunity allows diffuse interest 
groups to effectively promote reform goals (A) by serving as link between public opin-
ion and policy-makers and (B) by exploiting the temporary weakness of the opposition 
(Kollman 1998; Kingdon 2010; Dür/Mateo 2014).
3 Policy entrepreneurs: Activism of a well-positioned entrepreneur as a source of inno-
vation, expertise, institutional resources, and political connections can exploit perceived 
opportunities and leverage diffuse groups’ policy influence (Mattli/Woods 2009; King-
don 2010).
4 Governmental allies: Intense pro-reform mobilization leads to a bandwagon effect that 
strengthens the reform side of the debate and encourages public officials to actively side 
with the pro-reform coalition as “governmental allies” (Mahoney/Baumgartner 2015).
5 The post-crisis financial regulatory environment 
Regulatory reform emerged in a post-crisis environment which saw the legitimacy of 
the financial industry and its practices being strongly contested in the public sphere. 
The heightened media attention raised by the crisis increased the perception of undue 
industry influence. Previous regulatory deficits became the subject of public outrage, 
pushing financial regulatory reform into the arena of “noisy politics,” to use Culpep-
per’s terminology. As mentioned above, heightened salience is an important dynamic, 
since it can be a strong motivator for elected officials to act against the narrow interests 
of an industry. Now, financial regulation became highly salient with the wider public, 
but – as Kastner (2014: 3) could show – the consumer bureau became highly salient 
10 MaxPo Discussion Paper 16/1
with the wider public as well. The bureau’s increase in public salience is also visible in 
the increase in Internet searches in the US for the term “Consumer Financial Protection 
Agency,” as illustrated in Figure 1. 
Increased salience in the regulatory reform context was accompanied by qualitative 
shifts in policy-making that displayed increasing divisions among policy-makers and 
the private sector. In light of the devastating consequences of the financial crisis, policy-
makers started to call industry groups’ expertise into question, as Representative Brad 
Miller remarked in a statement in March 2009 about intended mortgage reform: “The 
political climate has changed. The foreclosure crisis has wreaked havoc on middle-class 
families and our economy as a whole. The industry’s arguments … are not at all con-
vincing” (Harney 2009). The financial sector was the culprit of the crisis. In his Wall 
Street speech in April 2010, the President made clear that he regarded consumer protec-
tion as an essential element of the financial reform, thereby risking “increasingly frac-
tious relations” with the financial industry (Cooper 2010). In April 2010, the New York 
Times highlighted the President’s stance against the financial industry: 
Addressing leaders of New York’s financial giants, including Goldman Sachs, Mr. Obama de-
scribed himself as a champion of change battling “battalions of financial industry lobbyists” 
and the “withering forces” of the economic elite. With his poll numbers sagging, the choreo-
graphed confrontation seemed aimed at tapping the nation’s antiestablishment mood as well as 
muscling financial regulation legislation through Congress. (Baker/Herszenhorn 2010)
Several examples from my interviews illustrate that the regulatory dialogue among in-
dustry groups and government officials had suffered from considerable cracks since the 
crisis. One indicator of such a crack is that financial groups learned about legislative 
proposals and intended policy changes much later than in the past, largely excluding 
industry groups from the agenda-setting phase of the decision-making process. Inter-
views conducted with industry groups in Washington corroborate a story that their 
knowledge of the particular content of the proposed consumer agency prior to the Trea-
sury’s blueprint in June 2009 was either unknown or extremely fuzzy. Some industry 
representatives reported that they saw themselves “cut out of the process” during early 
legislative debates. About the Treasury’s White Paper, one industry representative re-
membered talking to Treasury officials but having “very little impact on the adminis-
tration’s thinking on the consumer side of the law.” He also described how the regula-
tory dialogue had noticeably changed after the crisis, saying that regarding the policy 
proposal to establish a new consumer watchdog, industry associations “had almost no 
contact with the administration,” which he characterized as “extremely unusual.” Fi-
nally, when the White Paper was issued in June 2009, including a detailed provision 
on the creation of a consumer agency, industry groups were “aghast about was in it.”14 
Another interviewee from the industry side remembered lobbying on regulatory reform 
to have been “very frustrating” and “difficult.” About the legislative process, he recalled: 
“We were able to have a little bit of consultation with Barney Frank, while the House was 
14 Interview 113 with banking lobbyist: Washington, DC, 25 February 2014.
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putting together its bill, but not a lot, and very little with Chris Dodd, I am not sure we 
had any.”15 Banking lobbyists’ policy influence was largely curtailed in the immediate 
aftermath of the crisis, as one industry representative put it: “when I was trying to get 
something done for the biggest banks, there was not a lot I could do.”16 
These changes in interest group dynamics, as suggested here by anecdotal evidence from 
interviewees, are significant because they indicate that financial lobby groups had partly 
lost their political leverage. How did this crisis context, which derailed traditional mech-
anisms of capture, affect the political opportunity structure for diffuse interest groups?
6 Political opportunities: Access and receptivity 
Under public pressure, policy-makers’ reluctance to engage with the financial industry 
in the aftermath of the crisis was accompanied by increased receptivity to pro-reform 
demands from diffuse interest groups. First and foremost, in a qualitative shift in the 
policy-making environment from previously relatively obscure technocratic bodies to 
15 Interview 1 with banking lobbyist: Washington, DC, 20 September 2013.
16 Interview 113 with banking lobbyist: Washington, DC, 25 February 2014.
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the top legislative agenda of the administration, Congress and its committees opened 
new access points for a broader range of interest groups. Starting in early 2009, individ-
ual consumer representatives were repeatedly invited to testify in front of Congressional 
committees. Increased access of nonfinancial groups to the decision-making process 
was also accompanied by increased receptiveness of policy-makers to demands coming 
from these newly mobilized actors.
Consumer advocates had very limited capacity to push their advocacy goals during 
the housing boom that pre-dated the crisis, precisely because policy-makers were not 
inclined to listen to their demands. The political environment changed dramatically in 
the fall of 2008, when public anger arose over the industry being bailed out at taxpay-
ers’ expense. As public pressure grew, demands by pro-reform groups attracted atten-
tion among policy-makers. US authorities quickly acknowledged the need for stronger 
consumer protection after the financial crisis. In March 2009, Sheila Bair, Chair of the 
US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, noted: “There can no longer be any doubt 
about the link between protecting consumers from abusive products and practices and 
the safety and soundness of the financial system.”17 Consumer groups also found a 
sympathetic interlocutor in Congress. In light of the financial crisis, Democrats in Con-
gress decided early on to endorse regulatory reform. In October 2008, Representative 
William Delahunt and Senator Richard Durbin picked up the idea and introduced a bill 
entitled the Consumer Credit Safety Commission Act of 2008, H.R. 7258 and S. 3629, 
into Congress. The bill created a Consumer Credit Safety Commission. Although the 
bill was never enacted into law, it signaled the increased political willingness to enact 
consumer-friendly legislation in Congress to consumer advocates. 
Members of Congress increasingly responded to demands coming from consumer 
groups to restrict subprime lending and increase consumer protection. The changing 
political climate was clearly felt by consumer advocates, as one interviewee reported: 
People had been trying for a long time to bring reforms about with more or less good bills, with 
no success because there was this political and ideological opposition to regulating the markets 
which after all were providing such fabulous results for American consumers … . Now in the 
aftermath of the boom there was less confidence that the markets produced fabulous results 
and there was a much more receptive environment that we have to act on the lessons we have 
learned through this crisis.18
A Congressional staffer confirmed this interpretation, saying that “consumer things had 
been raised [by consumer groups] for a decade or so … but the government ignored 
them.” But in the midst of the turmoil of the financial crisis, “it had gotten more dif-
ficult to ignore them” – even for members of Congress who had not necessarily been 
17 Statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chair of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, on Modern-
izing Bank Supervision and Regulation before the US Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, 
and Urban Affairs; 19 March 2009.
18 Interview 115 with consumer advocate: Washington, DC, 18 March 2014.
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champions of consumer protection issues.19 Industry representatives also testified to the 
increasing receptivity of politicians and regulators to pro-consumer advocacy groups 
during the legislative process, as one banking lobbyist put it: “as we were at a position 
of weakness, they had a position of strength.”20 Polling data released by the Consumer 
Federation of America in September 2009 gives us clues about why the topic was very 
popular with decision-makers in general, with 57 percent of those polled supporting 
the idea of creating a new federal agency to protect consumers (Limbach 2009). Public 
opinion likely had an impact on policy choices, as the Wall Street Journal put it in a 
comment on the US Financial Reform Act, “the CFPA [Consumer Financial Protection 
Agency] became a symbol of the legislation, and many Democrats saw it as a way to sell 
the financial regulatory overhaul to voters” (Palletta 2010). 
To sum up, as predicted, the crisis had at least partly redistributed political leverage 
from financial interests to consumer advocates. 
7 Mobilization of diffuse interests
Another development that bolstered the influence of diffuse interest groups was their 
ability to forge coalitions among themselves, overcoming internal impediments to col-
lective action. The perception of opened-up political opportunities after the subprime 
mortgage crisis was an important trigger for collective action among diffuse interest 
groups. Indeed, the crisis turned out to be a major catalyst for the formation of a new 
alliance of civil society organizations among about 250 consumer associations, trade 
unions, NGOs, and grass-roots groups rallying around the notion of a consumer regu-
lator (Kastner 2014: 16). Although civil society groups had well-established connec-
tions among themselves, in May 2009 relations were formalized under the umbrella of 
“Americans for Financial Reform,” and regular meetings of task force subgroups started 
to take place. 
Table 2 gives an overview of the key groups forming the broad coalition under the um-
brella of AFR, which enabled consumer advocates to present a united front. Early on, 
the coalition members decided to focus their reform campaign on the establishment of 
a consumer protection agency. The consumer agency became the rallying point that all 
groups, despite their different advocacy goals, could agree on as a top legislative priority. 
The new and broad coalition among civil society organizations was made possible by 
the advocates’ perception of a policy window. Advocates realized that in order to win 
real reforms they had to take advantage of the public anger about costly bank bailouts 
and the political opportunities that presented themselves for regulatory change. One 
19 Interview 14 with Congress staffer: Washington, DC, 14 March 2014.
20 Interview 100 with financial industry lobbyist: Washington, DC, 16 September 2013. 
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coalition member reported: “Everybody understood the opportunity and that was a 
moment to be seized, there was a collective willingness to spend energy and resources.”21 
Pro-reform groups were keenly aware of the fleeting nature of their opportunity to set 
up a new and powerful consumer agency. They knew that their best opportunity was in 
the first years of the administration, when the Democratic Party had a majority in Con-
gress. After the midterm elections of 2010, the cushion in Congress would be smaller. 
The stars were aligned, so to speak, and reform advocates had to take advantage of this. 
In the words of one consumer representative, “the politics was right. We had a new 
presidency who had previously during the campaign expressed support for this; I knew 
Barney Frank and Chris Dodd, the chairs to the committees. That kind of alignment 
does not happen very often.”22 After the 2008 election, the Democratic Party enjoyed 
a comfortable margin in the House to pass reform legislation (with a majority of 51 
percent required). The election also brought a filibuster-proof Democratic majority to 
the Senate (sixty Democratic votes). If all sixty Senators were to vote for a reform bill, 
pro-reform advocates could overcome the expected Republican filibuster. Indeed, dur-
ing the final passage of the Dodd–Frank Act, the sixty votes in the Senate did enable the 
Democrats to pass the bill with all but three Republicans in opposition. 
Newly mobilized groups were key actors in transmitting public opinion to decision-
makers. One of the first steps of the coalition had been to provide support for local 
grass-roots groups and their activities in order to enable those groups to engage with 
their members of Congress.23 By channeling public opinion, pro-reform advocates 
were able to influence decision-makers; as one staffer put it bluntly: “AFR was able 
to be influential … they had special clout, because they were able to tap into public 
sentiment.”24 The AFR pro-reform groups were very active in lobbying Congress and 
top governmental officials throughout the long process that led up to the passage of 
the Dodd–Frank bill. Giving testimony in congressional hearings became one of the 
main communication channels for consumer groups. Between March and June 2009, 
pro-reform advocates testified in several House and Senate committee and subcommit-
tee hearings, providing a coherent “causal story” of policy failures in the run-up to the 
subprime crisis. During the passage of Dodd–Frank, at least twelve different members 
of the “Americans for Financial Reform” pro-reform coalition strongly supported the 
CFPB in testimony before the House and the Senate in several hearings between June 
and September 2009 (Kirsch/Mayer 2013). Since they had disseminated information 
about abusive lending practices in an effort to create momentum for reform, pro-re-
form groups now played an important role for the pro-reform advocates within the 
administration. Groups like the Consumers Union or the Center for Responsible Lend-
ing also collected testimonies by people wronged by abusive industry practices on their 
21 Interview 23 with consumer advocate: Washington, DC, 12 September 2013.
22 Interview 79 with consumer advocate: Washington, DC, 13 September 2013
23 Interview 23 with consumer advocate: Washington, DC, 12 September 2013.
24 Interview 34 with Congress staffer: Washington, DC, 7 March 2014.
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websites, asking people to share their “horror lending stories.”25 A comment by a senior-
level official involved in drafting the legislation clearly testifies to the role of pro-reform 
groups as a link between public opinion and policy-makers. He reported that newly 
mobilized groups “helped in bringing attention to the issues and trying to get the public 
focused on the key questions. … It definitely helped shape the debate and helped us to 
generate enthusiasm for what we were trying to do.”26 
The mobilization of non-financial groups had another important effect: namely, that 
it constrained the policy dominance of the financial industry lobby in the legislative 
process. Due to changed political dynamics, industry groups had to refrain from block-
ing the legislative proposal for a new consumer agency. Deprived of their veto capacity, 
and although nearly the entire financial industry was opposed to the general concept 
of a consumer protection bureau, the united front began crumbling during the passage 
of the House bill. Barney Frank, Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, 
struck a deal with the Independent Community Bankers Association (ICBA), exempt-
25 The website is available at <www.responsiblelending.org/about-us/contact-us/share-story.html>.
26 Interview 34 with Congressional staffer: Washington, DC, 7 March 2014.
Table 2 Selected actors supporting the CFPB under the “Americans for Financial Reform”
 umbrella
Name Founded No. of members Type of organization
AARP (American Association of 
Retired Persons)
1958 37 million Non-profit membership organization 
for people age 50 or over
American Federation of Labor 
and Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (AFL-CIO)
1955 1.4 million members Largest federation of unions in the 
US
Consumer Federation of 
America (CFA)
1968 300 non-profit 
organizations
Association of non-profit consumer 
organizations to advance the 
consumer interest
Center for Responsible Lending 
(CRL)
2002 – Non-profit consumer group fighting 
predatory lending practices
Consumers Union (CU) 1936 8 million subscriptions 
to newsletters
Independent, non-profit 
organization
National Association of 
Consumer Advocates (NACA)
– 1,500 attorneys Non-profit association of attorneys 
and consumer advocates
National Consumers League 
(NCL)
1899 – Consumer organization
National Community 
Reinvestment Coalition (NCRC)
1990 600 member 
organizations
Association that promotes access to 
basic banking services
Public Citizen 1971 80,000 members Consumer rights group, non-profit 
organization
Service Employees International 
Union (SEIU)
1921 1.9 million members Labor union
US Public Interest Research 
Group (US PIRG)
1970 26 state PIRGS Federation of state Public Interest 
Research Groups
Source: Assembled by the author.
16 MaxPo Discussion Paper 16/1
ing small banks from CFPB oversight. This neutralized the smaller community bankers, 
divided the industry, and considerably weakened the overall industry’s attempt to block 
passage of the CFPB or promote alternative proposals. From the industry groups’ point 
of view, the deal was a huge loss. Consumer advocates counted the semi-carveout for 
small banks under $ 10 billion as a partial victory, since the CFPB still had rule-writ-
ing authority over small banks. Small banks were only exempted from CFPB supervi-
sion and enforcement, which was to be conducted by prudential regulators instead. At 
the final stage of passage, during the joint conference committee, industry opposition 
proved unexpectedly weak, and no further amendments were offered that would have 
weakened the CFPB.27
To sum up: As predicted, the active involvement of pro-reform groups was spurred by 
the financial crisis and based on the perception of a “window of opportunity” for re-
form. Newly mobilized interest groups formed a broad-based pro-reform coalition as 
a countervailing force to financial industry interests, restraining the policy influence of 
the latter. As expected, diffuse interest groups acted as transmitters of public opinion, 
putting increasing pressure on policy-makers to actively pursue regulatory change, even 
counter to the interests of the more powerful financial lobby. Facing increased actor 
plurality and changed interest group dynamics, industry groups saw themselves forced 
to refrain from vetoing the policy process, which eventually led to a split of the opposi-
tion and a further weakening of financial sector groups. 
8 Policy entrepreneurship 
Another factor that boosted the influence of diffuse interest groups was the fact that 
a skilled policy entrepreneur invested time and resources into the reform cause. Pro-
change advocates found a strong and well-positioned policy entrepreneur in Harvard 
law professor and consumer advocate Elizabeth Warren, who would later become part 
of the administration when she became Assistant to the President and Special Advi-
sor to the Secretary of Treasury for the CFPB. She was therefore not only an expert on 
consumer finance and housing issues, but she was also politically well connected. In her 
position as Special Advisor to the Treasury at the CFPB, she defended the new consumer 
agency in Congressional hearings and various subcommittee meetings of the House 
of Representatives.28 Warren had become a highly visible political figure in Novem-
ber 2008 as Chair of the Troubled Asset Relief Program Congressional Oversight Panel 
(COP), which was charged with reviewing the current state of financial markets and 
the regulatory system. The first COP “Special Report on Regulatory Reform,” issued 
27 Interview 65b with consumer advocate: Washington, DC, 13 February 2014. 
28 Warren gave testimony about the CFPB to Congress in May 2011 and to the House Financial 
Services Committee in June 2009 and March 2011.
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in January 2009, included Warren’s proposal of a single federal regulator for consumer 
credit products.29 Warren also repeatedly denounced industry lobbying on TV shows 
such as The Daily Show with Jon Stewart and The Colbert Report, saying that industry’s 
aim was to “to stick a knife in the ribs” of the new bureau (Warren 2011). Throughout 
the reform debate, Warren served as a key expert. One Congress staffer remembered “a 
couple of instances where Warren was in Barney’s office and we talked to her – her ac-
ceptance was important, her assessment was important.”30 Warren was also viewed as 
an influential policy entrepreneur by interviewees from the industry side. One lobbyist 
reported that Warren was “a very effective” and “articulate” spokesperson, which gave 
the AFR coalition “additional clout.”31
The initial idea for a consumer protection agency had come from Warren, who had 
published articles in the summer of 2007 and in November 2008 arguing in favor of 
a Financial Product Safety Commission. At the time of publication, wider public at-
tention to Warren’s articles was only moderate. This situation changed with the finan-
cial crisis, and Warren’s policy solution suddenly started to match politicians’ needs to 
respond to public pressures. Warren had introduced the idea of a Consumer Finance 
Safety Commission in the 2007 journal article with a metaphor comparing safety regu-
lations for toasters to those for consumer financial products: 
It is impossible to buy a toaster that has a one-in-five chance of bursting into flames and burn-
ing down your house. But it is possible to refinance an existing home with a mortgage that has 
the same one in-five chance of putting the family out on the street. (Warren 2014: 1) 
On 19 March 2009, President Obama employed the same metaphor when he appeared 
on The Tonight Show with Jay Leno, clearly indicating presidential support for consumer 
protection reforms. Warren’s policy proposal of a Consumer Finance Safety Commis-
sion had slowly moved from the periphery to the center stage of politics. 
Warren was instrumental in rallying initial support for a single regulator among con-
sumer, labor, and other interest groups. Warren’s proposal enjoyed widespread support 
among consumer advocates.32 First discussions among consumer advocates and Warren 
about the policy proposal of a consumer regulator started to take place in the summer 
of 2008, before Obama was elected President. When pro-reform advocates convened 
a first preliminary meeting in Washington to form a coalition for financial reform in 
February 2009, Warren introduced the idea of a consumer finance protection agency to 
the audience (2014). In March 2009, two years after Warren’s first article was published, 
and in the midst of the turmoil caused by the financial crisis, advocates of a consumer 
agency undertook another attempt to enact legislation. According to Warren’s account, 
29 The full COP report is available at  
<www.un.org/ga/president/63/commission/regulatoryreform.pdf>.
30 Interview 66 with Congressional staffer: Washington, DC, 24 March 2014.
31 Interview 113 with banking lobbyist: Washington, DC, 25 February 2014.
32 Interview 65b with consumer advocate: Washington, DC, 13 February 2014. 
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she met with Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA) in early 2009, urging him to push for the 
agency (2014: 138). The two had known each other since the fight for bankruptcy law 
reform in 2005. In March, Kennedy, Senator Dick Durbin (D-IL), and Senator Chuck 
Schumer (D-NY) introduced the Financial Product Safety Commission Act of 2009 
into Congress (S. 566), proposing the creation of a regulator with sole responsibility 
to protect consumers according to Warren’s blueprint. Consumer groups and labor 
unions supported the bill. Representatives Bill Delahunt (D-MA) and Brad Miller (D-
NC) also championed the consumer agency and became co-sponsors of the bill. In 
April 2009, Senators Kennedy, Durbin and Schumer wrote a letter to Treasury Secretary 
Tim Geithner, urging him to include their proposed Financial Product Safety Com-
mission in the Administra tion’s plan for financial reforms (Durbin 2009). Also in April 
2009, Warren, according to her own account, successfully convinced Barney Frank, the 
influential Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, that the consumer 
agency was a politically viable idea (2014). 
To sum up: credit expert Warren became an influential policy entrepreneur who pro-
moted the proposal of a new regulator in tandem with the newly mobilized reform 
coalition. Warren’s academic work served as an important source of innovation, putting 
forward the idea of a new agency to protect consumers. She also successfully built sup-
portive coalitions for her idea, thereby exploiting opportunities opened up by the crisis 
and the excessive industry influence over regulation that it brought to the fore.
9 Governmental allies
The Obama administration played a lead role in promoting the regulatory reform fa-
vored by consumer advocates. The White House publicly entered the picture in June 
2009 with a White Paper which proposed five objectives for financial reform including 
a “Consumer Financial Protection Agency (CFPA), with the authority and accountabil-
ity to make sure that consumer protection regulations are written fairly and enforced 
vigorously” (Department of the Treasury 2009: 7). The White Paper had its roots in a 
brainstorming group which began work on an outline for financial reforms in early 
2009. By January 2009, the President charged a small group, including experts on finan-
cial institutions, law professors, and economists, with the task of drafting a first regula-
tory bill. Reforms of the framework for consumer protection regulations were a central 
part of the group’s discussions throughout the spring of 2009 and were debated with 
Secretary Geithner, National Economic Council Director Larry Summers, and eventu-
ally with the President all spring long. Based on their conclusions, the brainstorming 
group proposed an independent Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and later that 
year, in June 2009, the Treasury included the proposal of a new agency in the White 
Paper.
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During early discussions in the spring, consumer groups had become central interlocu-
tors for the administration and the Treasury Department to draft the new financial re-
form bill. Before the White House issued its blueprint for financial reform in June 2009 
which included the CFPB, consumer groups that would later become AFR had routinely 
met with Treasury officials to give advice and express support for a strong consumer 
regulator. Individual consumer groups (which at that point were not yet organized into 
a coalition) enjoyed access to informal consultations and had effective connections with 
Treasury staff – such as Eric Stein, who had become the top deputy of the Assistant 
Secretary of the Treasury Michael Barr after a career at one of the leading consumer 
organizations, the Center for Responsible Lending. Prior to his function at the Treasury, 
Barr himself had been involved in community development policies, where interac-
tions with consumer, housing, and community groups had largely shaped his views. 
During the passage of financial reforms, he became responsible for consumer financial 
protection policy, including the enactment of the Credit CARD Act of 2009 and the 
CFPB. When, in June 2009, the White House published its White Paper, Barr and his 
top deputy Stein were in charge of drafting the legislation that was implemented from 
the blueprint. During that legislative process, meetings between the Assistant Secretary 
of the Treasury and the AFR coalition took place on a regular basis.33 Within the ad-
ministration, Barr and Stein became the “behind-the-scenes heroes” for the consumer 
advocates in drafting strong language and pushing for the consumer agency (Warren 
2014: 162). 
From the beginning, the issue of a consumer regulator had strong presidential support. 
Personally enthusiastic about reform, Obama highlighted the new consumer regulator 
in several speeches and as a guest on The Daily Show with Jon Stewart and The Tonight 
Show with Jay Leno, clearly indicating presidential support. In a speech given on 9 Octo-
ber 2009, Obama stated his continuing support for the Consumer Financial Protection 
Agency, actively siding with consumer activists: 
[W]e need a Consumer Financial Protection Agency that will stand up not for big banks, not for 
financial firms, but for hardworking Americans … we need regulatory reform that will reward 
innovation and competition instead of short-cuts and abuses … we can’t let special interests 
win this fight. (Obama 2009)
The President called claims made in a campaign ad sponsored by the Chamber of Com-
merce about the new agency being harmful to small businesses “completely false” (ibid.).
Extensive mobilization of pro-reform groups in combination with the support of elite 
allies, including the President and the Treasury, made elected officials into allies advo-
cating for diffuse interests in financial reforms. Collective material resources mobilized 
by outside groups in favor of regulatory reform signaled to policy-makers that a strong 
pro-reform lobby was in place. One Congressional staffer testified to the relevance of 
33 Interview 34 with Congressional staffer: Washington, DC, 7 March 2014; and interview 65b 
with consumer advocate: Washington, DC, 13 February 2014. 
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this outside mobilization, saying that the “united front … was quite important. It gave 
the consumer and civil rights community … the ability to expand the battlefield.”34 
Moreover, strong presidential support for reform had already signaled to the commit-
tee leadership that the chances of passage would be good. Another Congressional staffer 
summarized the motivation for elected officials to become active pro-reform advocates 
as follows: “the consumer groups rallying the public and the media being just ready for 
anything on this stuff, and again the president at the height of his authority saying ‘I 
want this.’”35 Another respondent from the industry side confirmed this assessment: 
“The crisis gave [consumer groups] a great atmosphere politically, and then they had a 
White House and Treasury Department that was very sympathetic to them. That com-
bination gave them a lot of clout.”36
Most importantly, the Democratic leaders of the committees that handled financial re-
form – Representative Barney Frank, chairman of the House Financial Services Com-
mittee, and Senator Christopher Dodd, chairman of the Senate Banking Committee – 
both became active allies defending diffuse interests in the policy process. Both stood 
firm against nearly all weakening amendments and joined in support of strengthening 
ones. Several examples illustrate the close working relationships among the AFR coali-
tion and Congressional staff in the key committees. When legislative action moved to 
the House Financial Services Committee in the fall of 2009, consumer groups under 
the AFR umbrella started to cooperate with Barney Frank and his staff. Barney Frank 
became an influential advocate for the consumer cause who expressed his support for 
the idea of a consumer agency in one of the first meetings with the AFR coalition. The 
following passages stem from interviews with outside organizations and staff members 
in Congress. One reform advocate gave an explanation of the degree of cooperation 
and planning among the administration and consumer groups which testifies to the 
advocates’ exceptional access to the policy process: 
We had been talking to the Treasury people, then the President came out with his blueprint, and 
it included the CFPB. So that summer [2009] we had all these meetings and negotiations with 
Treasury and then with Barney Frank. We worked with them and advised them on the blueprint 
and then we worked with them on a strategy to draft the legislation that was implemented from 
the blueprint.37
Remarking on the cooperation with Senator Dodd’s staff, another AFR organizer de-
scribed the interest groups’ close relation with governmental allies in Congress this way: 
We had a big meeting with Dodd and his whole staff, asked … what the relationship would be, 
who we should work with, how we should work with them. We had three meetings with him 
and his whole staff in the course of the campaign, once at the start, once before the end, and 
once in the middle. We met with the staff … all the time.38 
34 Interview 66 with Congressional staffer: Washington, DC, 24 March 2014.
35 Interview 34 with Congressional staffer: Washington, DC, 7 March 2014.
36 Interview 113 with banking lobbyist: Washington, DC, 25 February 2014.
37 Interview 65b with consumer advocate: Washington, DC, 13 February 2014. 
38 Interview 10 with consumer advocate: Washington, DC, 28 September 2013.
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From inside Congress, the advocacy process looked similar. Congressional staffers in-
terviewed for this study on the House and Senate side reported that they relied on con-
sumer groups’ expertise for drafting legislation. On mortgage reform, Barney Frank’s 
staff reported that they relied on expertise from the Center for Responsible Lending, 
saying that they “got language when [they] needed it.”39 On the issue of preemption, 
staffers cooperated closely with the Consumer Federation of America. Within the broad 
coalition that AFR had brought together, one could find “experts on any given issue …
with invaluable [knowledge] in technical areas,” as a Congressional staffer reported.40 
Each of the groups brought a specific area of expertise on consumer financial issues to 
the table, so that Congressional staffers knew who to reach out to on the consumer side. 
As one Senate staffer recalled: 
There was somebody who knew about credit cards and debt collection and there was somebody 
who knew about housing. One or two experts in a couple different organizations would be the 
folks that we would call up and say, “Hey we’re working on this bill, what do you think needs to 
be in it, can you take a look, what lawyers, what professors can we talk to?”41 
One Congressional staffer saw AFR as “a collection of interest groups, many of which 
lend incredible know-how to drafting [legislation].”42 
To sum up, pro-reform advocates on the outside had well-established working relation-
ships with sympathetic government allies on the inside – namely, the two key Commit-
tee chairs Barney Frank and Chris Dodd, who pushed the legislation through Congress. 
The most accurate depiction of working relationships among advocates and friendly 
officials is that of members of a team, with advocacy groups serving as an important 
source of expertise in the drafting phase of the legislation. Finally, presidential support 
for a new consumer regulator was instrumental in making the idea more attractive to 
committee leaders.
39 Interview 66 with Congressional staffer: Washington, DC, 24 March 2014.
40 Interview 114 with Congressional staffer: Washington, DC, 17 March 2014. Cross-verification 
of evidence confirms this fact, which may be considered “cheap talk.” Information from vari-
ous members of the Congressional staff, consumer advocates, and industry lobbyists who saw 
themselves “shut out” testifies to the correctness of the assessment. 
41 Interview 34 with Congressional staffer: Washington, DC, 7 March 2014.
42 Interview 114 with Congressional staffer: Washington, DC, 17 March 2014.
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10 Conclusions
What can this episode tell us about the politics of financial reform after the crisis? This 
case study has shown that diffuse interests can be politically influential, even in a pol-
icy field that has been characterized as exclusively dominated by organized industry 
interests such as financial regulation. While consumer groups gained more access to 
the national policy-making process, industry groups saw their policy access curtailed. 
Through careful process tracing, I demonstrate that financial reforms are best explained 
through a theoretical framework which takes into account the role of diffuse interest 
groups. The results of applying the theoretically derived hypotheses to the empirical 
record of the case at hand are summarized in Table 3. This article tried to demonstrate 
that the story of post-crisis regulatory reform in the US was one of diffuse interest 
coalitions, policy entrepreneurship and governmental allies, as much as – if not more 
than – a story of concentrated industry capture. The importance of coalitions is par-
ticularly apparent in the formation of the broad-based civil society coalition under the 
“Americans for Financial Reform” umbrella that came together to advocate for a new 
consumer regulator. The engagement of this unprecedented coalition of nonfinancial 
groups in the reform debate increased actor plurality and reduced industry dominance 
throughout the legislative process. The cooperation with a well-positioned and savvy 
policy entrepreneur was another key factor in determining reform outcomes. Harvard 
law professor and consumer finance expert Elizabeth Warren became an entrepreneur 
defending the consumer regulator before Congress. Other important drivers of regula-
tor change representing diffuse interests were governmental allies, including the Presi-
dent and committee chairmen, who pushed the proposal for a new consumer watchdog 
through Congress. Notably, the committee chairmen responsible for financial reform 
became active proponents of the consumer cause and cooperated closely in team-like 
structures with the newly mobilized consumer advocacy coalition. The legislative out-
come was a winner-take-all result, with consumer groups winning the day and only 
minor carveouts for small community banks. 
Regulatory capture theories are the dominant theoretical lens used to explain US finan-
cial reforms after the 2008 crisis. Their theoretical insights clearly helped identify the 
causes for the incrementality of the overall reform law in spite of the major shock the 
crisis had caused. My goal, however, has been to show that this is only half of the story, 
and that diffuse interests did not go unrepresented in the American financial regula-
tory overhaul. The findings presented here correspond to Trumbull’s argument that 
diffuse interests are commonly represented in public policy, even in the field of financial 
regulation (Trumbull 2012). Ultimately, the story of the struggle between consumer 
advocacy groups and financial industry groups in the case of the CFPB suggests that 
coalition-building among diffuse interest groups and with important elite allies on the 
outside and the inside of government considerably affects that group’s ability to shape 
regulatory policy, allowing groups to bear on policy decisions independently of an in-
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dividual group’s material resources. Accordingly, the case study of the CFPB confirms 
Trumbull’s proposition that researchers seeking to understand the outcome of interest 
group conflicts must look beyond the simple variable of material resourcefulness.
Finally, finance is a technical and highly complex issue area where diffuse interests gen-
erally appear relatively ineffective against concentrated industry interests. Financial reg-
ulation therefore constitutes a hard case for demonstrating the role of diffuse interests 
groups in public policy. In doing so, this research joins a number of studies that show 
that business power can be curbed by public salience (Culpepper 2011; Pagliari 2013), 
institutions (Hacker/Pierson 2002) and ideas (Bell/Hindmoor 2014). The argument 
here focused on relations between interest groups and government officials to explain 
how increased mobilization of diffuse interests can affect the ability of organized con-
centrated interests to affect policy. 
Table 3 Summary of findings
  Propositions   Findings
1. Favorable opportunity structures: politicians 
under public salience and electoral constraints 
become more receptive and grant new access 
points to diffuse interest groups.
Yes. Congress and its committees opened new 
access points for a broader range of interest 
groups. Due to substantial public pressure, 
demands by pro-reform groups attracted political 
attention.
2. Diffuse interest coalitions: new coalitions 
mobilize, enhancing collective action capacity 
of diffuse interests to serve as a link between 
public opinion and policy-makers.
Yes. Formation of “Americans for Financial 
Reforms” (AFR) as a countervailing force to the 
financial industry, based on the perception of 
a “window of opportunity” and a lack of unity 
among industry groups.
3. Policy entrepreneurs: presence of 
entrepreneurs who can provide expertise, 
institutional resources, etc., thereby leveraging 
advocacy groups’ influence.
Yes. Elizabeth Warren, a politically savvy consumer 
credit expert, joins pro-reform groups and 
becomes an important entrepreneur.
4. Governmental allies: Joining the bandwagon, 
public officials actively side with mobilized 
diffuse interests to promote same policy 
solution in team-like structures.
Yes. Well-established working relations among 
advocates and key government allies, Committee 
chairs Barney Frank and Chris Dodd, with 
advocates serving as source of expertise.
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